Esta asignatura forma parte del Módulo II, que contiene asignaturas que proporcionan conocimientos avanzados en una gran variedad de áreas de la economía, que los alumnos eligen libremente. Algunos campos se cubren en una sola asignatura, mientras que otros se estructuran a través de varias asignaturas, en los trimestres tercero al quinto. Los alumnos pueden elegir entre todas las asignaturas optativas ofrecidas, con la única restricción de cursar al menos tres por cada trimestre.
Finanzas empresariales
101121
2017-18
MÁSTER UNIVERSITARIO EN ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS
6
OPTATIVA
Cuatrimestral
Inglés
La irrelevancia de la estructura financiera.
Teorías de la estructura financiera basadas en impuestos.
Asimetrías de información y estructura financiera.
Teorías de agencia de la estructura financiera.
La política de dividendos.
Las ofertas públicas de adquisición y de venta.
G1 - Demostrar unos sólidos conocimientos de teoría económica y de las
técnicas económicas, econométricas y computacionales relevantes.
G2 - Aplicar los conocimientos adquiridos y ser capaz de resolver problemas en
entornos nuevos o poco conocidos dentro de contextos más amplios o
multidisciplinares relacionados con el estudio de la economía y las finanzas.
G3 - Integrar sus conocimientos y estar capacitado para formular juicios a
partir de una información incompleta o limitada, que incluya reflexiones sobre
las responsabilidades sociales y éticas vinculadas a la aplicación de sus
conocimientos y juicios económicos.
G4 - Analizar de forma crítica, evaluar y sintetizar ideas nuevas y complejas
en relación con teorías y metodologías empíricas en el ámbito de la economía.
G5 - Diseñar y llevar a cabo un proyecto de investigación con un alto nivel
académico, formulando hipótesis razonables, en el área de la economía.
G6 - Presentar oralmente trabajos científicos y técnicos en economía, a
públicos especializados y no especializados, de un modo claro y sin
ambigüedades.
G7 - Elaborar adecuadamente composiciones escritas y redactar proyectos de
trabajo o artículos científicos.
G8 - Organizar y planificar su propio trabajo, fomentando la iniciativa y el
espíritu emprendedor.
G9 - Integrarse en grupos de trabajo dedicados a proyectos de investigación
económica.
G10 - Demostrar capacidad de estudio, síntesis y autonomía suficientes para,
una vez finalizado el Máster, llevar a cabo una tesis doctoral en el área de
la economía.
EO18 - Estar familiarizado con el análisis de las decisiones de financiación de las empresas y otros aspectos de su relación con los mercados de capitales, en particular las teorías basadas en problemas de información.
AF1.- Clases teóricas (30 horas)
AF2.- Clases prácticas (15 horas)
AF5.- Estudio del contenido teórico del curso (60 horas)
AF6.- Resolución de ejercicios prácticos (30 horas)
AF7.- Preparación de presentaciones en clase (15 horas)
Clases teóricas en las que se desarrollan los temas del programa de la
asignatura.
Clases prácticas en las que los alumnos resuelven ejercicios previamente
destribuidos por el profesor.
Estar familiarizado con el análisis de las decisiones de financiación de las
empresas y otros aspectos de su relación con los mercados de capitales, en
particular las teorías basadas en problemas de información.
SE1.- Ejercicios (ponderación mínima 0.05 y ponderación máxima 0.3)
SE2.- Presentaciones (ponderación mínima 0.05 y ponderación máxima 0.15)
SE4.- Examenes (ponderación mínima 0.7 y ponderación máxima 0.95)
Esta asignatura de carácter optativo se imparte en el tercer trimestre, dentro
del Módulo II (este módulo se imparte en los trimestres tercero, cuatro y
quinto).
En el tercer trimestre el estudiante puede elegir 3 de las siguientes
asignaturas, con una carga lectiva de 6 ECTS cada una de ellas:
Cód. 101116 - Economía industrial
Cód. 101117 - Economía pública
Cód. 101118 - Macroeconomía II
Cód. 101119 - Econometría de series temporales
Cód. 101120 - Valoración de activos I
Cód. 101121 - Finanzas empresariales
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1. The Irrelevance of Financial Structure
2. The Static Trade-off Theory of the Financial Structure
3. Asymmetric Information Theories of the Financial Structure
4. Agency Theories of the Financial Structure
5. Security Design Theories of the Financial Structure
6. Debt Policy and Debt Structure
Stulz, R. and H. Johnson (1985), "An Analysis of Secured Debt," Journal
of Financial Economics, 14, 501-522.
7. Product Market/Capital Market Interactions
8. Behavioral Corporate Finance
9. Corporate Governance I: The Market for Corporate Control
10. Corporate Governance I: Other Mechanisms of Governance
Este documento puede utilizarse como documentación de referencia de esta asignatura para la solicitud de reconocimiento de créditos en otros estudios. Para su plena validez debe estar sellado por la Secretaría de Estudiantes UIMP.
Descripción no definida
Cuatrimestral
Créditos ECTS: 6
Repullo Labrador, Rafael
Doctor en Economía, London School of Economics
Profesor de Economía
Director del Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)
Almazán Caravantes, Andrés
Doctor en Economía, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Profesor de Economía
University of Texas