Esta asignatura forma parte del Módulo II, que contiene asignaturas que proporcionan conocimientos avanzados en una gran variedad de áreas de la economía, que los alumnos eligen libremente. Algunos campos se cubren en una sola asignatura, mientras que otros se estructuran a través de varias asignaturas, en los trimestres tercero al quinto. Los alumnos pueden elegir entre todas las asignaturas optativas ofrecidas, con la única restricción de cursar al menos tres por cada trimestre.
Economía bancaria
101129
2017-18
MÁSTER UNIVERSITARIO EN ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS
6
OPTATIVA
Cuatrimestral
Inglés
Los bancos en la economía neoclásica.
Las relaciones prestamista-prestatario.
Teorías de la intermediación financiera.
La regulación bancaria.
La gestión de riesgos en la banca.
G1 - Demostrar unos sólidos conocimientos de teoría económica y de las
técnicas económicas, econométricas y computacionales relevantes.
G2 - Aplicar los conocimientos adquiridos y ser capaz de resolver problemas en
entornos nuevos o poco conocidos dentro de contextos más amplios o
multidisciplinares relacionados con el estudio de la economía y las finanzas.
G3 - Integrar sus conocimientos y estar capacitado para formular juicios a
partir de una información incompleta o limitada, que incluya reflexiones sobre
las responsabilidades sociales y éticas vinculadas a la aplicación de sus
conocimientos y juicios económicos.
G4 - Analizar de forma crítica, evaluar y sintetizar ideas nuevas y complejas
en relación con teorías y metodologías empíricas en el ámbito de la economía.
G5 - Diseñar y llevar a cabo un proyecto de investigación con un alto nivel
académico, formulando hipótesis razonables, en el área de la economía.
G6 - Presentar oralmente trabajos científicos y técnicos en economía, a
públicos especializados y no especializados, de un modo claro y sin
ambigüedades.
G7 - Elaborar adecuadamente composiciones escritas y redactar proyectos de
trabajo o artículos científicos.
G8 - Organizar y planificar su propio trabajo, fomentando la iniciativa y el
espíritu emprendedor.
G9 - Integrarse en grupos de trabajo dedicados a proyectos de investigación
económica.
G10 - Demostrar capacidad de estudio, síntesis y autonomía suficientes para,
una vez finalizado el Máster, llevar a cabo una tesis doctoral en el área de
la economía.
EO19 - Conocer los aspectos más característicos, tanto micro como macroeconómicos, del funcionamiento y la regulación de la actividad bancaria desde la perspectiva de las modernas teorías de la intermediación financiera.
AF1.- Clases teóricas (30 horas)
AF2.- Clases prácticas (15 horas)
AF5.- Estudio del contenido teórico del curso (60 horas)
AF6.- Resolución de ejercicios prácticos (30 horas)
AF7.- Preparación de presentaciones en clase (15 horas)
Clases teóricas en las que se desarrollan los temas del programa de la
asignatura.
Clases prácticas en las que los alumnos resuelven ejercicios previamente
destribuidos por el profesor.
Conocer los aspectos más característicos, tanto micro como macroeconómicos,
del funcionamiento y la regulación de la actividad bancaria desde la
perspectiva de las modernas teorías de la intermediación financiera.
SE1.- Ejercicios (ponderación mínima 0.05 y ponderación máxima 0.3)
SE2.- Presentaciones (ponderación mínima 0.05 y ponderación máxima 0.15)
SE4.- Examenes (ponderación mínima 0.7 y ponderación máxima 0.95)
Profesor Responsable de la asignatura
Esta asignatura de carácter optativo forma parte del Módulo II, y se imparte
en los trimestres cuarto y quinto.
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Fail?," European Economic Review, 46, 1599-1622.
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Banking," Journal of Financial Intermediation, 13, 156-182.
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Gale, G., and M. Hellwig (1985), "Incentive Compatible Debt Contracts: The
One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, 52, 647-663.
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Debt," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 1-41.
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Action Choices," Journal of Economic Theory, 52, 45-67.
Mookherjee, D., and I. Png (1989), "Optimal Auditing, Insurance and
Redistribution," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104, 399-415.
Tirole, J. (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, Chapter 3.
Townsend, R. (1979), "Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly
State Verification," Journal of Economic Theory, 21, 265-293.
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Diamond, D. (1984), "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review
of Economic Studies, 51, 393-414.
Diamond, D. (1991), "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans
and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, 99,
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Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole (1997), "Financial Intermediation, Loanable
Funds, and the Real Sector," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,
663-691.
Krasa, S., and A. P. Villamil (1992), "Monitoring the Monitor: An Incentive
Structure for a Financial Intermediary," Journal of Economic Theory,
57, 197-221.
Mester, L., L. Nakamura, and M. Renault (2007), "Transactions Accounts and
Loan Monitoring," Review of Financial Studies, 20, 529-556.
Rajan, R. (1992), "Insiders and Outsiders: the Choice between Informed and
Arm's-Length Debt," Journal of Finance, 47, 1367-1400.
Repullo, R., and J. Suarez (1998), "Monitoring, Liquidation, and Security
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Press, Cambridge, MA: Chapters 2 and 7.
Allen, F., and D. Gale (2007), Understanding Financial Crises, Oxford
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Allen, F., and D. Gale (1998), "Optimal Financial Crises," Journal
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of Banking and Finance, 4, 335-344.
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Diamond, D., and R. Rajan (2005), "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," Journal
of Finance, 60, pp. 615-647.
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Interest Rate Risk," European Economic Review, 38, 1363-1389.
Holmström, B., and J. Tirole (1998), "Private and Public Supply of Liquidity," Journal
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Holmström, B., and J. Tirole (2011), Inside and Outside Liquidity,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Chapters 1-4.
Kashyap, A., R. Rajan, and J. Stein (2002), "Banks as Liquidity Providers: An
Explanation of the Co-Existence of Lending and Deposit-Taking," Journal
of Finance, 57, 33-73.
König, P. (2015), "Liquidity Requirements: A Double-Edged Sword," International
Journal of Central Banking, 11, 129-168.
Repullo, R. (2005), "Liquidity, Risk-Taking, and the Lender of Last Resort," International
Journal of Central Banking, 1, 47-80.
Rochet, J.-C., and X. Vives (2004), "Coordination Failures and the Lender of
Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European
Economic Association, 2, 1116-1147.
Shin, H. (2010), Liquidity and Risk, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
Chapter 8.
Vives, X. (2014), "Strategic Complementarity, Fragility, and Regulation," Review
of Financial Studies, 27, 3547-3592.
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regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, Bank
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framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, Bank
for International Settlements.
Elizalde, A., and R. Repullo (2007), "Economic and Regulatory Capital in
Banking: What is the Difference?," International Journal of Central
Banking, 3, 87-117.
Gordy, M. (2003), "A Risk-Factor Model Foundation for Ratings-Based Bank
Capital Rules," Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12, 199-232.
Gordy, M., and B. Howells (2006), "Procyclicality in Basel II: Can We Treat
the Disease Without Killing the Patient?," Journal of Financial
Intermediation, 15, 395-417.
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Financial Regulation," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25, 3–28.
Kashyap, A., and J. Stein (2004), "Cyclical Implications of the Basel II
Capital Standards," Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic
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85, 351-378.
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1. The Industrial Organization of Banking
2. Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information
3. Competition and Risk-Taking in Banking
4. Verifiability and Debt Contracts
5. Banks as Delegated Monitors
6. Banks as Liquidity Suppliers
7. The Prudential Regulation of Banks
8. Recent Developments
Este documento puede utilizarse como documentación de referencia de esta asignatura para la solicitud de reconocimiento de créditos en otros estudios. Para su plena validez debe estar sellado por la Secretaría de Estudiantes UIMP.
Descripción no definida
Cuatrimestral
Créditos ECTS: 6
Repullo Labrador, Rafael
Doctor en Economía, London School of Economics
Profesor de Economía
Director del Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)
Profesor Responsable de la asignatura