


Economía bancaria

MÁSTER UNIVERSITARIO EN ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS

UNIVERSIDAD INTERNACIONAL MENÉNDEZ PELAYO

Másters
en universitarios

Este documento puede utilizarse como documentación de referencia de esta asignatura para la solicitud de reconocimiento de créditos en otros estudios. Para su plena validez debe estar sellado por la Secretaría de Estudiantes UIMP.



DATOS GENERALES

Breve descripción

Esta asignatura forma parte del Módulo II, que contiene asignaturas que proporcionan conocimientos avanzados en una gran variedad de áreas de la economía, que los alumnos eligen libremente. Algunos campos se cubren en una sola asignatura, mientras que otros se estructuran a través de varias asignaturas, en los trimestres tercero al quinto. Los alumnos pueden elegir entre todas las asignaturas optativas ofrecidas, con la única restricción de cursar al menos tres por cada trimestre.

Título asignatura

Economía bancaria

Código asignatura

101129

Curso académico

2017-18

Planes donde se imparte

[MÁSTER UNIVERSITARIO EN ECONOMÍA Y FINANZAS](#)

Créditos ECTS

6

Carácter de la asignatura

OPTATIVA

Duración

Cuatrimestral

Idioma

Inglés

CONTENIDOS

Contenidos

- Los bancos en la economía neoclásica.
- Las relaciones prestamista-prestatario.
- Teorías de la intermediación financiera.
- La regulación bancaria.
- La gestión de riesgos en la banca.

COMPETENCIAS

Generales

G1 - Demostrar unos sólidos conocimientos de teoría económica y de las técnicas económicas, econométricas y computacionales relevantes.

G2 - Aplicar los conocimientos adquiridos y ser capaz de resolver problemas en entornos nuevos o poco conocidos dentro de contextos más amplios o multidisciplinares relacionados con el estudio de la economía y las finanzas.

G3 - Integrar sus conocimientos y estar capacitado para formular juicios a partir de una información incompleta o limitada, que incluya reflexiones sobre las responsabilidades sociales y éticas vinculadas a la aplicación de sus conocimientos y juicios económicos.

G4 - Analizar de forma crítica, evaluar y sintetizar ideas nuevas y complejas en relación con teorías y metodologías empíricas en el ámbito de la economía.

G5 - Diseñar y llevar a cabo un proyecto de investigación con un alto nivel académico, formulando hipótesis razonables, en el área de la economía.

G6 - Presentar oralmente trabajos científicos y técnicos en economía, a públicos especializados y no especializados, de un modo claro y sin ambigüedades.

G7 - Elaborar adecuadamente composiciones escritas y redactar proyectos de trabajo o artículos científicos.

G8 - Organizar y planificar su propio trabajo, fomentando la iniciativa y el espíritu emprendedor.

G9 - Integrarse en grupos de trabajo dedicados a proyectos de investigación económica.

G10 - Demostrar capacidad de estudio, síntesis y autonomía suficientes para, una vez finalizado el Máster, llevar a cabo una tesis doctoral en el área de la economía.

Específicas

EO19 - Conocer los aspectos más característicos, tanto micro como macroeconómicos, del funcionamiento y la regulación de la actividad bancaria desde la perspectiva de las modernas teorías de la intermediación financiera.

PLAN DE APRENDIZAJE

Actividades formativas

AF1.- Clases teóricas (30 horas)

AF2.- Clases prácticas (15 horas)

AF5.- Estudio del contenido teórico del curso (60 horas)

AF6.- Resolución de ejercicios prácticos (30 horas)

AF7.- Preparación de presentaciones en clase (15 horas)

Metodologías docentes

- Clases teóricas en las que se desarrollan los temas del programa de la asignatura.
- Clases prácticas en las que los alumnos resuelven ejercicios previamente distribuidos por el profesor.

Resultados de aprendizaje

- Conocer los aspectos más característicos, tanto micro como macroeconómicos, del funcionamiento y la regulación de la actividad bancaria desde la perspectiva de las modernas teorías de la intermediación financiera.

SISTEMA DE EVALUACIÓN

Descripción del sistema de evaluación

SE1.- Ejercicios (ponderación mínima 0.05 y ponderación máxima 0.3)

SE2.- Presentaciones (ponderación mínima 0.05 y ponderación máxima 0.15)

SE4.- Exámenes (ponderación mínima 0.7 y ponderación máxima 0.95)

PROFESORADO

Profesor responsable

Repullo Labrador, Rafael

Doctor en Economía, London School of Economics

Profesor de Economía

Director del Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)

Profesorado

Profesor Responsable de la asignatura

HORARIO

Horario

Esta asignatura de carácter optativo forma parte del Módulo II, y se imparte en los trimestres cuarto y quinto.

BIBLIOGRAFÍA Y ENLACES RELACIONADOS

Bibliografía

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2. Credit Markets with Asymmetric Information

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